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TRANSITIONAL ECONOMY

ABSTRACT
We conducted a predominantly qualitative study of organizational moral atmosphere
(OMA) in seven companies in the city of Wuhan, on the Chinese mainland. Our findings were
consistent with other commentaries that have identified the mainland as a problematic context
in which to achieve organizational integrity because of market distortions, public cynicism,
and substantial weaknesses in the legal system and in civic accountability. We discovered also
that in-company propagation of moral ideology appeared to have little beneficial impact on
OMA, because of ideological incoherence and incompatibility with unofficial values and
practices such as guanxi that are regarded as survival imperatives under network Capitalism.
Ideology also failed to address the felt distributive inequity that fuelled various forms of fraud
and deception. Disciplinary regimes that were extensively punishment-oriented failed to
resolve this and other endemic problems of dependency and lack of work discipline in the
SOEs. There were glimmers of hope in at least one Joint Venture Company that had adopted a
robust system of rational-legal administration introduced by a foreign partner. Developmental
approaches to improving OMA remain largely untried.

Descriptors: ideology, ethics, leadership, morality, China, Communist.

INTRODUCTION

In this paper, we examine moral atmosphere (moral ethos) in seven enterprises in the
Chinese mainland, in order to identify what may be done to achieve and maintain
organizational integrity within a wider context that is, by all accounts, problematic. Moral
atmosphere is a force-field of norms, aspirations, assumptions and expectations among
members of a social entity about good or bad, and right or wrong, channelling how they
define, construe and tackle everyday issues and dilemmas (Snell 2000: 267). We assume that
organisational moral atmosphere (OMA) subsumes, in addition, an enterprise’s theory-in-use
of justice, embodied in systems of regulation, resource allocation, remuneration, and
discipline. We assume also that OMA influences whether organizational behaviour is honest
or corrupt, reliable or fraudulent; whether resource allocation is equitable or tainted with
cronyism; whether systems create value or produce substandard outputs; and whether
environmental policies are socially responsible or entail despoliation. Scrutinized from a
critical, ethical stance (de George 1995), OMA may be adjudged sound, questionable, or
problematic in terms of conduciveness for high integrity policies, practices and conduct.

Figure 1 represents the components of OMA and the main influences upon it. The
model derives from Snell (2000: 280), but has been considerably modified and elaborated in
the light of the qualitatively oriented research reported in this paper. Guided by the revised
model, we now review the morally problematic contemporary social, economic and political
context of OMA in Chinese mainland enterprises.

The Legal, Political and Social Background

Figure 1 implies that if governments were accountable to empowered, critically
informed electorates, if businesses were accountable to market forces, and if both were
subject to an independently and systematically administered body of law, OMA would be
sound, and less corruption and more social responsibility would ensue. Findings by
Transparency International (2000) lend some support to that proposition. They show, for
example, that among mixed economy nations, the Scandinavian countries (high accountability
societies) are perceived to have low levels of corruption, whereas the Chinese mainland (a
relatively low accountability society) has a comparatively high perceived level of corruption.
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Figure 1. Relationships Among Antecedents, Aspects, and Outcomes of Organisational Moral Atmosphere
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Equitable treatment
versus favoritism &
cronyism

Weak Legal System

The Chinese mainland historically lacks a systematic, mature legal system. In Imperial
China, the District Magistrate administered law (also tax collection, education and a host of
other local services) within a territory approximately the size of an English county. Exercising
‘rule by man’, yet without specialist legal training, he ‘combined the roles of detective, police
chief, prosecutor, judge and jury’ (Dawson 2000: 45). Those pursuing litigation were
subjected to cruelty, humiliation and extortion by government runners (messengers,
policemen, guards, etc.), and were expected to tremble in court. Local communities thus kept
the law at arm’s length, and as far as possible justice was administered within the clan or
guild (Dawson 2000: 161-162). The Imperial legal system failed to develop independently of
government and its local administrative apparatus (Dawson 2000: 163-164). It was abolished
after Liberation, and a new legal system was not introduced until 1982 (Davies 1995). Laws
in the Chinese mainland abound but are not fully or systematically applied. A long, slow
journey from ‘rule by man’ to ‘rule of law’ may be underway (Hao 1999: 417). According to
Figure 1, a weak legal system discourages development of sound OMAs.

Weak Civic Accountability

Political pluralism, and administrative transparency, rigour and professionalism are
hallmarks of civic accountability (Tanzi 1998). In the Chinese mainland, however, there is
one-Party rule, and at local level, guanxi (connection-based) factions and networks run the
Party machine. The legacy of the Imperial system, when junior clerks corruptly derived all
their income from predatory fees (Dawson 2000: 49) pervades government administration.
Further up the hierarchy, self-serving collusion between state officials and leaders of State
Owned Enterprises (SOEs) is endemic (Walder 1995: 285; Nimerius 1997; He 1998; Hao
1999). In attempts to build civic accountability, the central government introduced a code of
ethics for cadres in 1993, subsequently elaborated this (Ma 1998: 1287; Hao 1999: 414), and
set up complaint hotlines for the public (McDonald 1995: 185). There were crackdowns on
corrupt low-ranking officials, then higher-ranking ‘moral degenerates’ were targeted (Becker
1995, 1998; South China Morning Post 1996; China Business Information Network 1998;
China Daily 2000a). Critics, however, dismissed such campaigns as the token purging of
showcase targets in the play of factional politics (China News Analysis 1995; Mirsky 1995;
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Lam 2000; South China Morning Post 2000). Civic accountability appears to remain weak,
which, according to Figure 1, discourages the development of sound OMAs.

Market Distortions

Sweeping economic de-regulation and market reforms have not created a level playing
field for market competition. Local officials tend to block private businesses from entering or
growing in the market, unless they give kickbacks or red packets in exchange for permits,
financial capital and trading rights (McDonald 1995: 182; Wank 1995: 166-167). For some
protection against arbitrary ‘rule by law’ (not ‘rule of law’) harassment, leaders of private
companies maintain relationships with networks of officials, by giving them gifts, banquets,
employment positions and free company shares (Wank 1995: 168-171). Thus guanxi, the
cultivation of trust through gift-giving and social connections, is used as a competitive
weapon. Some contend that guanxi, by ‘oiling the wheels’, supports rather than subverts the
development of free markets (Davies 1995; Tan 1999; Wank 1995: 155). Tsang (1998: 69)
thus uses the term organizational guanxi to refer to the cultivation of cooperative
relationships between a company as a whole and the agencies with which it deals. However,
the official position of the government is that all forms of guanxi are corrupt because of their
inherent favouritism (Wong and Chan 1999: 114), and this is an assumption that we share:
according to Figure 1, such market distortion and injustice discourages the sound
development of OMAs. Nonetheless, in the absence of strong legal and regulatory systems,
guanxi, whether at individual or organizational level, is driven underground rather than
purged (Xin and Pearce 1996: 1654-1655), and indeed may be an inherent feature of the
Chinese mainland’s ‘network capitalism’ (Boisot and Child 1996).

Transitionality and Possible Normative Incoherence in Avowed Morality

Whitcomb, Erdener and Li (1998) identify Confucianism, Maoism and the pragmatic
market enterprise ethic of Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997) as the three main strands of thought
relevant to business ethics in the Chinese mainland, and we summarise these next.
Confucianism represents traditional Chinese ethics, absorbing much of Taoism (Carnogurska
1998: 211). Traditional social norms include reciprocity with others (de Bary 1991: 3-4),
avoidance of selfishness (Pye 1995: 41), the Golden Rule (Confucius 1979: 135), and respect
for social hierarchy through face giving and face-saving (Bond and Huang 1987: 247-248).
4

Notably, law (fa) was traditionally regarded as an evil, necessary only for controlling the
morally bankrupt (Steidlmeier 1997). Notably also, guanxi was seen as honourable so long as
the parties acted in principled manner (Pye, 1995: 45-46; Lovett, Simmonds and Kali 1999:
236; Steidlmeier 1999): ‘people who share a guanxi relationship are committed to one another
by an invisible and unwritten code of reciprocity and equity’ (Luo 1997: 44).

Under Mao Zedong (1893-1976), traditional Chinese ethics were officially rejected.
Guanxi was disapproved (Pye 1995) but re-emerged under cover (Walder 1986). Loyalty to
the people, the Party and the leader replaced filial respect of parents and loyalty to the
emperor (Fairbank and Reischauer 1978: 491). Hierarchical rank and promotion were
downplayed and workers were urged to challenge line authority, but there was, nonetheless,
some continuity with Confucianism, in that material incentives were disdained, as was
individual glorification or self-interest (Shenkar and Ronen 1987). SOEs were set up as an
‘iron rice bowl’ system of guaranteed employment, egalitarian rewards and lifelong welfare,
centring on the danwei or work-unit (Lü and Perry 1997). A profound non-market ethic was
created that persists in many contemporary SOEs (Ding, Goodall and Warner 2000: 222).

The economic reforms that began in 1978 overturned core Maoist values. Deng
Xiaoping’s famous proclamations: ‘To get rich is glorious’ (Ralston, Egri, Stewart, Terpstra
and Yu 1999: 417), and ‘Whether a cat is black or white makes no difference — as long as it
catches mice, it is a good cat’ (CNN 2001) encapsulated pragmatic market enterprise values.
While transformation of the Chinese mainland’s economic system into network capitalism has
thus entailed further moral upheaval, some Confucian values persist (Ralston, Egri, Stewart,
Terpstra and Yu 1999). Maoist values have nonetheless waned as the post plus skills payment
system (gangji gonzi zhi) replaced wage egalitarianism (Easterby-Smith, Malina and Lu 1995;
Warner 1996b: 204). Money has become the primary source of work motivation (Fisher and
Yuan 1998), and there is sympathy for legally questionable business methods (Whitcomb,
Erdener and Li 1998). It is possible that morality on the Chinese mainland has fallen into
normlessness or anomie (Passas and Agnew 1997), paralleling what commentators claim has
happened in Western industrial nations, where tradition-based normative consensus has
broken into half-forgotten fragments (MacIntyre 1988; Taylor 1991; Feldman 1998). Unlike
the West, however, the Chinese mainland lacks a mature legal system that could serve as an
alternative basis of social and economic order. Figure 1 suggests that unless, somehow, a
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coherent body of avowed morality persists, then the development of sound OMAs is impaired,
precipitating high levels of corruption (Shih 1994; He 1998; Husted 1999).

Official Moral Optimism — and General Public Cynicism

Rather than embracing political democracy as a means of constraining corruption
while fostering economic growth (Ehrlich and Lui 1999), the Party has attempted to provide
moral leadership through ideology and propaganda. Socialist spiritual civilization
construction (SSCC) became Party policy in 1982 (Dirlik 1989: 35; Lu 1996). A central
SSCC programme began in 1986 (Lynch 1999), aiming to cultivate ‘healthy personality’ (Xu
1997: 90) and to implant the ‘Five Stresses’: civil manners, propriety, cleanliness, order and
morality; and the ‘Four Beauties’: of spirit, language, behaviour and environment (Dirlik
1989: 36). SSCC envisages a groundswell of high morale, cultural pursuits, and ‘a healthy
atmosphere of opposing superstition and ignorance and resisting crooked ideas and evil
thoughts of all kinds’ (Ding 1999). SSCC attributes wrongdoing to weak culture and
individual moral turpitude, rather than to institutional failure, and has sought remedies in
deviance control, ideological education and thought reform (Shih 1994; Einwalter 1998; He
1998; Hao 1999: 411-412; Lynch 1999). SSCC remains a Party priority (McDonald 1995:
175-6). Indications are, however, that SSCC lacks credibility among the public (Lynch 1999).
It is widely perceived that there is reluctance to tackle corruption among the most senior
officials, who are protected (Burns 1994: 57-58; Root 1996: 752). A common saying is that
those in power are stupid if they do not use it to earn as much as possible (Huang 2001: 34).
According to Figure 1, moral cynicism among the general public discourages the sound
development of OMA.

Aspects of Organizational Moral Ethos

Our review suggests that in the Chinese mainland, weak legal and regulatory systems,
poor civic and market accountability, economic transitionality, and public cynicism all
militate against the sound development of OMA. Our own research will, besides examining
internal aspects of OMA, also consider the coherence or otherwise of avowed business values,
which could, according to our model, be a potential saving grace. We assume that a soundly
developed OMA would be a strong force for enterprise practices that are honest, reliable,
equitable, value enhancing and environmentally responsible. We now introduce and explain
6

the elements of OMA, as represented in Figure 1, commenting where literature suggests likely
patterns in Chinese organizations.

Leaders’ Moral Development and Character

By this, we mean the virtue or otherwise of leaders in the organization in question,
indicated, for example, by whether they fight, resist or collude with corruption. In
Confucianism, only the virtuous should become leaders and role models (Shafer 1997). The
proposition, represented in Figure 1, that the character of leaders effects OMA, has theoretical
support (Graham 1995; Lichtenstein, Smith and Torbert 1995). Gini (1998) argues that
leaders who are positive models and mentors inspire moral self-efficacy among the workforce.
There is, however, a wide gap between ideals and reality in and around many Chinese
organizations, especially SOEs, which are illegally ‘milked’ by their supposed leaders and
monitors (The Economist 2000), and are said to have become ‘poor temple(s) with a rich
monk’ (Lee 1999: 57). Once again, this phenomenon may be a legacy from Imperial China,
where higher officials took advantage of being stationed above much of the law (Dawson
2000: 162), rather than acting as the ‘gentlemen’ that they were supposed to be. According to
Figure 1, conduct by leaders that lacks integrity, or is corrupt, discourages the sound
development of other aspects of OMA.
Moral Self-Efficacy of the Workforce

By this, we mean the extent to which employees are confident in exercising principled,
autonomous moral judgement in relation to workplace moral issues and dilemmas. Such
spiritual sovereignty contrasts with dependency, or retreat into self-serving, self-preoccupied
subservience (Gini 1998: 308). The danwei system induced extreme dependency (Walder
1986); and even enforced infantilism (Giddens 1988) akin to the helplessness of long-term
psychiatric patients and prison inmates (Shenkar 1996). Arguably, this was also a legacy of
the tragic Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). SOEs no longer function as total institutions
(Goffman 1961; Shenkar 1996), but some still serve as shelters (Shenkar 1996: 900).
Commentators argue that organisational inertia (Ding, Goodall and Warner 2000), and
political concern about weakness in the national social security system (Lau 1997; China
Daily 1999) sustains a dependency ethos not only in SOEs (Warner 1995; Francis 1996), but
also in some foreign-invested Joint Venture Companies (JVCs) (Chan 1997: 105-106). It
7

would follow from this, that many enterprises house a mass of middle-aged and older
employees, who have spent their entire careers under a combination of political subservience
and economic sheltering, which may not have fostered the development of moral self-efficacy.
According to Figure 1, low moral self-efficacy among the workforce would discourage the
sound development of other aspects of OMA.

Formal Moral Governance

Snell (2000: 281) defines formal moral governance (FMG) as the ‘systems for
determining and enforcing official ethical standards within an organisation’, and implies that
among possible approaches to FMG, arbitrary coercive imposition or ‘rule by law’ may little
better than laxity in encouraging the sound development of other aspects of OMA. Our own
research, reported more fully in the ‘findings’ section, generated the following non mutually
exclusive FMG categories: (a) laxity (b) arbitrary coercive imposition (c) ideology or
identification, (d) open dialogue and (e) procedurally just, consensually legitimate, systematic
and transparent regulation, a kind of ‘rule of law’ within the enterprise.

Historically, the SOEs functioned as quasi religious orders, boarding schools and
prisons (Shenkar 1996), with FMG based on arbitrary coercion and ideology, but this became
lax as politicization de-intensified. More recent reforms may have encouraged a shift back
toward arbitrary coercion by managements that have enjoyed empowerment. The threats of
xiagang [the sending home of off-duty workers (Lee 1999)], privatization (Lau 1999),
contract based hiring and even layoffs (Warner 1996a; Ding, Goodall and Warner 2000),
combined with a lack of wider employability, have rendered SOE workforces vulnerable to
coercive imposition. SOE directors have gained ‘one pen, one mouth’ authority (Lee 1999:
57). Their cross-appointment to Party secretary or Union chair posts (Lee 1999: 59) has
reduced even the token power of Union and Party branches to resist managerial imposition
(Lu and Child 1995; Shenkar 1996: 901; Ding, Goodall and Warner 2000: 221). Union
branches have lost credibility (Lee 1999: 58-59), and the Party’s role has been redefined as
that of assisting management in raising productivity (Lee 1999: 59). The tone of Lee’s (1999)
account of disciplinary regimes in Chinese enterprises, featuring meticulous and somewhat
harsh rules and controls, backed by heavy fines, suggests that management have been inclined
to leverage their power, adopting FMG based on arbitrary coercion, rather than developing
just and systematic regulation. Accounts of ‘sweatshop’ factories, often overseas Chinese8

invested and Western-backed, where rural migrants suffer humiliating punishments (Asia
Monitor Resource Centre and Hong Kong Christian Industrial Committee 1997; Chan and
Senser 1997; Solinger 1997; Boje 1998), convey this message emphatically. Coercive
imposition may not foster high levels of integrity, and also raises questions of rights
violations.

Basis of Moral Authority

According to Snell (2000: 282-283) moral authority in an organization means power
to define what is acceptable and what is not. Three bases of moral authority (BMA) are: (a)
the political play of domination, manipulation and ‘headship’, (b) deferential trust, and (c)
critical trust. After Snell (2000), we would rank these in ascending order, according to their
expected contribution to sound OMA development. Under deferential trust, authorities are
assumed, by default, to act with integrity, care, and wisdom, in accordance with moral
tradition. Critical trust stems from transparency and openness, where justice is seen to be done.
However, in the Chinese mainland, headship (Westwood and Chan 1992), under which those
in positions of authority are protected by guanxi, may predominate. Huang (2001) found, for
example, even below head of department level, that incompetent staff, who moonlighted
during working hours, were protected by Party connections.

Other Aspects of Organizational Moral Atmosphere

Other aspects of OMA mentioned in Figure 1 lay beyond the scope of the research
reported here. According to Snell (2000: 283), deep, implicit socialization (DIS) ‘proceeds
day to day as a hidden curriculum of controls, rewards, mentoring, implicit role modelling,
and informal storytelling’. Snell (2000: 285) defines morality behind normative structure
(MBNS) as the set of norms, values and moral motivations that people in an organization
perceive others to embrace in actual day to day practice. Corporate outlook toward
stakeholders (COTS) is the mode through which competing needs and moral claims among
various stakeholder groups are adjudicated and catered for (Snell 2000: 286).
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THE RESEARCH

Our research was conducted in Wuhan, the largest city in Central China, with 7
million people in an area of 8,467 square kilometres. Wuhan ranks fifth or sixth among
Chinese cities in terms of economic production, having enjoyed average GDP growth of over
8 percent per annum since 1982 (Flood 1996). Although not in the vanguard of early
economic reforms, Wuhan has been at the forefront of the downsizing of government
agencies and the redefinition of their role ‘from micro-management to macroeconomic
supervision’ (Gu Jiaqi 1996: 123). For example, Wuhan’s municipal industrial bureaux have
become state asset management companies, able to sell equities in their subsidiaries, and to
set up joint ventures involving them (Yang 2000). Solinger (1999) reports that the non-state
sector in Wuhan is ‘vibrant’, although the state sector still accounted for as much as 80.6% of
employment in 1996. Wuhan’s problems during economic transition have included a wave of
early retirements (Paul and Paul 1995), rates of xiagang reaching 13.7% of the total
employees in enterprises (Solinger 1999), plus an above average unemployment rate of 6.5%
(Bottelier 1998). In the late 1990s, Wuhan, like many other cities across the Chinese mainland,
was wrestling with tension between pressing on with market reforms and enterprise
restructuring, and the need to arrange the orderly resettlement of displaced urban workers
(Solinger 1999). The local political and social background was not atypical of large Chinese
cities.

The original, Western-originated OMA model had not crystallized until after data
collection began, and in any case was modified substantially during data analysis. Adopting a
predominantly qualitative approach, we sought to understand OMA in a small number of
companies of varying ownership types. In order to make the research manageable, we focused
on an accessible selection of antecedents and aspects of OMA. The research questions,
themselves emergent, addressed in this paper are:
1. (Relating to normative coherence of avowed morality). What business values were
avowed? How do the values link to the main moral traditions? To what extent do they
form a coherent whole? How compatible are they with prevailing unofficial values?
2. (Partially relating to moral self-efficacy of the workforce). As perceived by management,
how strong is the legacy of the ‘iron rice bowl’ in terms of the lack of an internalized
work ethic among the workforce?
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3. (Relating to FMG). Who are the agents of company moral ideology? How is moral
ideology promulgated at company level? What is the perceived impact on moral conduct?
4. (Also relating to FMG). Do internal systems of regulation and justice emphasise arbitrary
‘rule by law’ or consensual ‘rule of law’? Where do rules come from? How strictly are
they applied?
5. (Relating to BMA). What empowers/disempowers enterprise leaders when establishing
what is morally acceptable and what is not?
6. Overall, what aspects of (internal) OMA appear to make a difference to organizational
integrity in the problematic context of China’s business environment?

Focal Companies

Our seven case study companies, accessed through local connections, comprised two
large SOEs, two smaller SOEs with shareholding structures, two foreign-invested JVCs and
one large private company. Table 1 summarizes background data about them.

The two large SOEs were Wuhan Iron & Steel (Group) Corporation (WISCO) and
Changjiang Energy Group Corporation (CE). WISCO was founded in 1958 as an icon of
socialism (Tomlinson 1997). With 120,000 employees, 18 steel mills and 35 supporting
factories engaged in iron mining, and steel smelting, casting & rolling, it is a steel town in
itself (The Economist 1992; Smith and Heim 1995). A parent-subsidiary structure with 14
subsidiaries was created in the mid 1990s. At the time of research, WISCO was planning to
sell-off non-core assets (Tomlinson 1998). CE was founded in 1958 and has 14,000
employees in Wuhan. Its core business is designing, manufacturing and installing turbogenerator machines for power stations and ships. Under government supervision, the
company made various acquisitions and has 17 subsidiaries.

The two smaller, shareholder-invested SOEs were Wuhan Department Store Group
(WDS) and Wuhan HiTech Venture Company (HVC). WDS was founded in 1959, supervised
by Wuhan commercial commission. In 1986, it became a limited company, with minority
shares owned by 15 large enterprises in Wuhan, three banks, and 16 retail stores outside
Wuhan. WDS was the first company outside Shenzhen Special Economic Zone to get
approval to list on its stock market (Asian Wall Street Journal 1992), majority shareholdings
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remaining with state-invested organs. Its core business is retail chain stores across Hubei
province, but it also has wholesale, property, recreation, and clothing businesses. Of 12
subsidiaries, eight are foreign-invested JVCs, four are wholly owned. Our focus was on
WDS’s wholly owned main departmental store in the city centre of Wuhan, with 3,500
employees, and on the minority Hong Kong Chinese invested shopping plaza situated
alongside it, employing another 1,000 people. Wuhan City Committee and 4 other state
organs founded HVC in 1992 as a state-invested enterprise. After HVC became a joint stock
company in October 1997, a private Hong Kong-backed, Shenzhen-based company bought
31% of the shares and private individuals another 20%. The company produces welding mask
covers, current and voltage control devices, and designs and installs fire prevention systems
for high rise buildings.

The two JVCs were Eurobeer (EB) and Dongfeng-Citroen Automobile Company
(DCA). EB is a Sino-French JVC set up in 1997 by Wuhan Dongxihu Brewery Group and
Danone, the former with a 40% stake, the latter with 60%. The company employs 3,500
people in its beer manufacturing and bottling factory. The Chinese parent began
manufacturing in 1982, and after two factories merged in 1991, became a shareholder
company in 1993. DCA is a Wuhan-based Sino-French JVC car factory with 2,600 employees,
set up in 1992 by Dongfeng (Second Motor Co.) and Citroen, and is the largest foreignfunded project in Wuhan. The French have a 30% stake (25% from Citroen, 5% from two
French banks). The Dongfeng parent company is a large SOE, comprising 9 divisions, with its
wholly owned truck factory located in NW Hubei.

Our private company was Red Heart King (RHK). RHK began with seven founderpartners as a private business in 1994, manufacturing and distributing an iron tonic. It grew
rapidly, becoming a listed company (Leggett 1998), with 10,000 employees in 22 provincebased branches and 3000 county level branches across the Chinese mainland. Our focus was
on Hubei province branch and the central HQ offices in Wuhan.
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Table 1
Focal Companies
Company Ownership Structure
WISCO
Very large SOE
CE
Large SOE

Core Business
Iron & steel processing
Manufacturing turbogenerating machines
Partially floated SOE
Department store and
shopping plaza; retail
chain stores
Majority privatized SOE Electrical equipment
60% French, 40%
Beer manufacturing and
Chinese JVC
bottling
30% French, 70%
Automobile
Chinese JVC
manufacturing
Listed stockholding
Manufacturing and
company
distributing an iron tonic

Established
1958
1958

Employees
120,000
14,000

WDS

1959

4,500

1992
1981 (Chinese)
1997 (JVC)
1992

2,000
3,500

1994

10,000 at
group level

HVC
EB
DCA
RHK

2,600

Data Gathering Procedures

From December 1998 to April 1999, 65 interviews were conducted in Wuhan, with a
total of 87 senior and middle managers/officers, 3 workers and one commentator. All
respondents were Mainland Chinese, with the exception of one Hong Kong/Canadian Chinese,
who was present at part of a group interview. Respondents are listed in Table 2.

Table 2
Interviews Conducted
Company
WISCO

CE
WDS

HVC
EB
DCA

Interviews
Group of 12 (plant managers and company level Party officers)
Solo with plant manager/secretary of the Party committee at one plant
Solo with 8 middle managers
Group of 3 (general manager/Union chairman, 2 assistant general managers)
Solo with 8 middle managers
Solo with chairman of the board
Group of 5 middle managers
Follow-up interview with one of the departmental managers
Solo with 9 middle managers
Solo with a local University professor as commentator
Group of 3 (general manager, capital operation manager, company secretary)
Solo with 6 middle managers
Group of 3 (general manager, Union president, Union vice president)
Solo with 4 middle managers
Solo with deputy general manager
13

RHK

Group of 3 officers from personnel management section
Group of 5 (Party secretary, middle manager and 3 workers)
Solo with 8 middle managers
Solo with Party secretary (twice)
Solo with vice president /Union chairman
Solo with 8 middle managers

We developed a structured interview guide for the senior respondents, covering
ownership structure, business strategies, ideological and ethical education, company values,
payment schemes, regulatory and disciplinary procedures, involvement in anti-corruption and
SSCC activities and campaigns, and hypothetical ethical dilemmas. We intended that
discussion of the hypothetical cases would ease the interviews toward disclosure of actual
ethical problems within the organization or in its transactions with stakeholders. Interviews
with middle managers were structured around the moral ethos questionnaire (MEQ) (Snell,
Taylor, Chu and Drummond 1999), translated into simplified Chinese characters. The MEQ
contains nine multiple-choice items covering ethical aspects of management and
organizational behaviour, each with six options matching the Kohlbergian moral stages at
organizational level. The MEQ also includes five Likert scale items relating to moral practices
and outcomes noted in Figure 1: these are detailed at an appropriate point in the findings
section below. In this research study, given doubts about the applicability of Kohlberg to the
Chinese mainland (Dien 1982), the MEQ was employed mainly as a catalyst for obtaining
examples and illustrations from respondents, in explanation and justification of their MEQ
selections and ratings. One author together with local investigators interviewed all senior
respondents, and some middle managers. Local investigators interviewed most of the middle
managers alone, after training by the authors. Given the sensitivity of the topic, and the
importance of ‘face’ (Shenkar 1994: 23), tape recording was not attempted. Extensive notes
were taken in Chinese and English. Company reports, newsletters, brochures, booklets,
speeches and video extracts, and local press cuttings were translated into English and used as
supplementary documentary sources.

Data Interpretation

Transcript material was sorted according to emergent themes, regardless of their
relationship to extant category schemes. Data was then marshalled into qualitative tables
comparing each enterprise across the emergent themes. Once initial thematic groupings had
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been identified, the Snell (2000) model provided a provisional basis for constructing
synthesized coherence (Golden-Biddle and Locke 1997: 29-30) among otherwise unconnected
categories. The model facilitated inter-linkage between what would otherwise have remained
an intuitively bundled miscellany of items on value aspirations, model workers, control
systems, punishments and incentives, welfare and dependency, anti-corruption, guanxi,
‘scandal’, etc. One principal investigator, less familiar with the Chinese mainland context,
developed initial extensive data categorizations and arrived at a higher-order inter-category
synthesis. That work was then checked and refined by the other principal investigator, on the
basis of the latter’s intimate familiarity with the language, culture and unofficial business
practices on the Chinese mainland.

FINDINGS

The Normative Coherence of Avowed Morality

We begin analysis of normative coherence by identifying clusters of avowed
organizational values and their possible links to the traditions of Confucianism/Taoism, neoMaoism, pragmatic market enterprise, and modernism. After noting inter-company
differences, we assess whether the overall set of avowed organizational values forms a
coherent whole and is compatible with prevailing unofficial values.

Avowed Organizational Values

Among values avowed as slogans or proverbs in brochures, reports or speeches, and
sometimes illustrated by storytelling, there were seven main generic clusters.

Serving the Customer God, Marching to the Market. All seven companies stressed the
need to serve customers and to survive competitive markets. The slogan, ‘The customer is our
God’, was repeated at four companies, including the two large SOEs. Several stories reflected
this emphasis. At WDS, a middle manager related, ‘A customer’s child took a pee in the shop,
the salesperson came to clean out before that customer could made an apology’. Another
WDS manager reported, ‘A customer behaved badly when buying shoes. He threw a shoe
onto the floor three times. Eventually he thanked the supervisor for picking it up three times
for him’. The general manager/Party secretary at a WISCO steel mill said, ‘in the past, 50 tons
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of silicon steel was the minimum delivery load. Recently, someone wanted just 300 kilograms.
The workers package small loads and even use their own car to deliver’. Referring to a change
in corporate identity, he claimed, ‘The daughter of the Emperor has married the market’.
WISCO was, according to its December 1996 brochure, ‘marching to the market’. At CE, a
middle manager reasoned, ‘If we cannot sell services and products to our customers, the
enterprise cannot make profits and survive, and eventually the staff will lose their jobs’.

Quality and Technological Advance. Reflecting government prompting (Zhang 2000),
most companies officially aspired to high quality and technological advancement. While there
may have been gaps between rhetoric and reality (Zhang 2000: 95-96) at least four companies,
including the two large SOEs, had won quality prizes or competitions. WDS had the ‘Mai
Shou’ system of strict quality inspection or ‘customs areas’. At EB, a company formula was
‘1% = 100%: 1% quality failed means 100% quality failed to customers’. With it went a story
that, at a time of insatiable consumer demand, the former EB general manager, discovering
imperfection, halted all dispatches, called a factory meeting, and secured agreement on better
quality inspection procedures.

Unity and Co-operation. All seven companies extolled unitary ideology (Fox 1974).
Internally, this meant shared goals, co-operation, teamwork and collegiality. For example, the
ex-general manager of EB had urged staff to: ‘Break the barrier between classes, break the
barrier between permanent and contract staff, break barriers of age and position, while HVC’s
general manager advocated ‘working cohesively’, through ‘a unified set of committees,
systems and mechanisms’. There were, however, differences between companies in how they
construed their relationship with wider society. Slogans for the two large SOEs (WISCO and
CE) subordinated enterprise interests to those of the nation. The converse applied at the
private RHK and privatized HVC, where (in ‘General Motors’ fashion) a contribution to the
company was held per se to be a contribution to society. A contract worker at DCA’s paint
shop, introduced to us by the Party, articulated a third kind of relationship between enterprise
and society, portraying it as a Darwinian struggle that required internal unity:

‘We have not established a social insurance system and business competition is very
cruel. While unemployed workers receive benefit in the West, here they get nothing.
The life or death of this company is at stake. Nearly all employees want to know how
the business is really doing. We pay close attention to sales volume, and regard quality
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as all-important, since we are a famous brand. People at the end of the line are always
coming to check the quality of the work of the front line, because it will affect them. If
they find problems at the front line, they request improvement. Only if we co-operate
well can we have a high quality product.’

Perseverance, Hard Work, Voluntarism, and Altruism. Stories at one SOE, both JVCs
and at RHK reflected the Maoist spirits of voluntarism and altruism (Hua 1995: 42-44). Even
staff who were sick were said to have had joined heroic salvage operations at the WDS
warehouse during the floods of 1998. At DCA, a story told of how teams overcame problems
with new conveyor equipment by lifting automobiles manually. A company proverb at RHK
advised: ‘If you persevere, you can turn an iron rod into a needle’. RHK’s Party
secretary/regional chief executive recommended two articles by Mao Zedong: ‘Serve the
People’, and ‘The Foolish Old Man Who Removed the Mountains’, the fable teaching the
power of determination. He hailed Founder-president Xie Sheng-ming, whom he said spent a
third of his time in rural villages, delivering by tricycle, a model of selflessness and service to
society.

Blending Spiritual and Material Motivation. Two SOEs, WISCO and WDS,
articulated Party policy (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific 1999), by aspiring to both spiritual
civilisation (as in SSCC) and material civilization (the creation of wealth and prosperity),
presenting these as complementary projects, not as an either/or dichotomy. They were joined
by the private RHK, whose vice president/Union secretary explained that he and the other cofounders had grown RHK in order to get rich, and that now, as one of Wuhan’s largest
taxpayers and donor to flood relief and education funds, the company was giving back to the
country. RHK’s Party secretary and regional chief executive said that Xie Sheng-ming ‘now a
rich man, who can leave his money to two generations, still wants to carry on his work to
serve society’. He added: ‘In China, if people only get spiritual rewards they are being fooled,
but if they only get material rewards they are being damaged. Here we get both.’

Continual Improvement . Four companies (DCA, WISCO, WDS and RHK) officially
aspired to work-related self-improvement. At DCA, a hagiographic booklet (DongfengCitroen Automobile Company 1988) described model workers from the Wuhan plant, many
of whom enacted this virtue in solving technical problems. At WISCO, an employee won a
prize for the slogan, ‘The work today is better than yesterday, tomorrow it is better than
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today’. A motto of WDS’s chairman was ‘If you don’t change anything, you’re not doing
anything’. RHK’s company logo had the shape of a comma, and one of its company proverbs
ended with the instruction, ‘Fulfil your duty and do it well, comma forever and never full
stop’; another proverb advised: ‘Don’t contrast your virtues with others’ defects, but compare
your demerits with others’ strengths’. In the spirit of collective learning, although literally in
contradiction to the latter proverb, RHK had set up a failure research institute, and had
produced case studies of other private companies on the traps and problems of expansion.

Rule of Law. This was advocated in the two JVCs and at WDS, whose management
had learned about rational-legal administration from the Hong Kong based parent company of
a subsidiary JVC. Evidently impressed by this Weltanschauung, Mao Dong-sheng and the
Chinese leaders of DCA and EB firmly asserted that the rule of law supported both the
operation of the market economy as a whole and the internal operations of companies. For
example, DCA’s Chinese general manager told us:

‘It is necessary for China to go to the market economy. The development of China
comes a little later than the developed countries. Many believe that the thinking and
values of the people will develop along with the development of the economy. We
think that the market economy is under the control of law, and that with the
development of the economy, the people’s ethics and values will also develop’.

Inter-Company Differences in Avowed Values

There were two main differences across enterprise types in terms of avowed values.
Advocacy of the rule of law, as noted above, was one of them, and appeared to reflect
learning from joint venture partners. The other pattern of difference concerned economic
sheltering, which persisted as a fragile legacy of the ‘iron rice bowl’ at the larger SOEs and at
the two JVCs, but not elsewhere. WISCO described itself as a ‘total community’ but had
already retrained and redeployed 70,000 out of a total workforce of 140,000 (including 60,000
retirees), in subsidiaries earmarked for privatization. CE saw itself as provider of ‘socially
responsible, rational and open’ welfare services, but the general manager quoted Zhu Rongji’s
ominous statement: ‘Let enterprises close if they are going bankrupt’. The majority Chinese
side at DCA had adopted a ‘one company, two employment systems’ arrangement. When
facing economic difficulties (Seidlitz and Murphy 1998), DCA had sent some core workers
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home on xiagang and had laid off contract workers, but regarded laying off core workers as
politically impossible. At EB, it was with great reluctance that the Chinese had acceded to
proposals by the majority French side to close one factory.

In contrast, at born-private RHK, the philanthropy of RHK founder-president Xie
Sheng-ming reflected Confucian obligations of wealth (Anagnost 1989), rather than sheltering,
so the company had had no compunction in laying off half of its 20,000 workforce in 1997,
nor in regularly dismissing staff with poor sales figures. Mentioning this, RHK’s Party
secretary and regional chief executive, himself on a one-year contract, declared, ‘The
company is a young person’s Shangri-La, they can develop here’. The two smaller SOEs,
which had adopted shareholding structures, acclaimed the end of economic sheltering. At the
de facto privatised HVC, a speech by the general manager announced that he would instigate
job transfers, demotions and terminations, advising: ‘Have no messiah, rely on yourself — no
work, no pay!’ At WDS, a company song employed the metaphor of a tidal wave to remind
employees: ‘Even in the safe city environment you are aware of crisis’. A newspaper item
(Yang and Xiong 1999) on the philosophy of WDS’s chairman, Mao Dong-sheng reported
(somewhat wishfully):

‘Traditionally, under the system of the planned economy, there were two big bowls of
rice. Enterprises asked for funding from the government, and enjoyed the big bowl of
rice from the government. Staff members working in the enterprises enjoyed the big
bowl of rice from the enterprise. These two big bowls of rice seriously restricted
enterprises’ contribution to the country and staff members’ creativity for the enterprise.
Setting up a shareholding system instantaneously broke these two bowls. This resulted
in a big shock for members of staff.’

Ideological Loose Coupling

Table 3 heuristically relates avowed organizational values, all of which bar one (we
touch on private property rights below) have been identified in the preceding text, to four
moral traditions. Some values shown as new ones in the table may be linked, if not in terms of
genealogy, then at least by imaginative association, to neo-Maoism or to traditional
Confucianism/Taoism. For example, Confucian self-cultivation (Chan 1985: 230n; Ivanhoe
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1993) may correspond to contemporary emphasis on self-improvement, as in this account by
RHK’s Party secretary:

‘I wanted to fire a subordinate, but my counterpart in head office, whom I model
myself on, advised me that if a person is essentially good, you can train him. I took his
advice to heart. When my subordinate discovered that I was concerned that he should
improve himself, he became motivated to do so’.

Table 3
Avowed Values Matched to Moral Traditions
Traditions
Confucian/
Taoist

Neo-Maoism

Transformed ideals
Self-cultivation
Obligations of wealth
Harmony
Selflessness
Serving the people
Iron rice bowl Ô Shelter

Ô
Ô
Ô
Ô
Ô
Ô
Ô

New manifestations
Continual improvement
Philanthropy, taxes
Co-operation
Collegiality & teamwork
Serving the customer God
?????

Persisting ideals

Perseverance & hard work
Voluntarism & altruism
Spiritual civilization
Pragmatic
market
enterprise

Modernism

Market competition
Profit and wealth creation
Quality
Self-sufficiency
Private property rights
Technological advancement
The rule of law

Our overall observation on Table 3 is that the avowed values are loosely coupled, in
four respects. First, connecting new values to old traditions requires considerable leaps of
moral imagination (for example spinning Maoist ‘serving the people’ into ‘serving the
customer’, or Confucian ‘selflessness’ into ‘collegiality and teamwork’). Second, considered
together, the avowed values are characterized by ‘eclectic richness and inconsistency’, a
feature also of classical Chinese ethics (Hua 1995: 33-34). Third, key neo-Maoist values have
lost their way, the shelter is crumbling and the nature of spiritual civilization is vague. Fourth,
some pragmatic market enterprise values are controversial. Managers generally appeared to
support them, but hinted at resistance among workforces — as Perry (1997: 53) notes, ‘even
the humblest of China’s workers (have) absorbed some lessons from decades of Communist
discourse on exploitation and class struggle’. For example, Mao Dong-sheng noted opposition
to the principle of dividend payment:
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‘We must, first and foremost, make money, for without profit, we can’t allocate
anything to the shareholders. This is obvious, but some employees think that while it
is reasonable to give the profits to the government, it’s unreasonable to give profits to
other personal shareholders. It’s a problem of how they perceive private property
rights. People do not easily come to accept this kind of right’.

Unofficial Guanxi Versus Avowed Values

A final test of normative coherence of avowed morality is its compatibility with two
prevailing unofficial norms, organizational guanxi and expediency.

Organizational Guanxi: Interviewees reinforced the impression, noted in the literature
review, that under the Chinese mainland’s system of network capitalism, organizational
guanxi is a necessary — underground — means of company role assertion (Waters and Bird
1989). This applied across all ownership types. For example, visiting officials from another
province asked the general manager of CE, the large SOE, to install a machine within 4
months, rather than the standard 12 months. He agreed, and when the deadline was met, the
client company sent CE 14,000 wine bottles, one for each employee. CE responded by
deducting the price of the wine from the project charges. When the client needed additional
installation, CE secured the contract against stiff competition, even though the new work was
not part of their core expertise. At born-private RHK, the vice president/Union chairman
explained that organizational guanxi with officials was ‘essential for our business expansion’,
but that the company sought to stamp out individual guanxi involving self-serving deals
between individual salespeople and distributors. Organizational guanxi appeared to be
embedded in the ownership structure of HVC, the small, privatized SOE, where it was
reported that government officials were major shareholders but also represented major
customers.

An

unwelcome

manifestation

of

organizational

guanxi

involved

‘recommendations’ by high-level government officials for relatives or friends to be given
employment. Both JVCs (EB and DCA) had acceded, as had the born-private RHK. Mao
Dong- sheng of WDS, a smaller, shareholder invested SOE, admitted that it was hard to say no:

‘One of the difficulties is the relationship net is too complicated. A great many high
officials recommend people to my company, but I have rejected them strictly.
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Sometimes, it is not easy to refuse, and I have to use some tricks to reject personal
recommendations’.

Expediency: Expediency may be regarded as an umbrella value, subsuming
questionable practices such as organizational guanxi, and conflicting with spiritual civilization,
for all the vagueness of that concept. Interviewees reported various pragmatic ways of
furthering company interests, which they did not explicitly link to Deng Xiaoping’s ‘black or
white cat’ maxim. For example, a middle manager, who described RHK as a Confucian
company declared also:

‘I was a teacher in a University before I came here, but I changed myself from a
Confucian to a businessman. As a teacher, I seldom borrowed money and once I
borrowed, I would try to pay back as soon as possible, but as a businessman, I will try
to put off the payment because the competition is merciless.’

Formal Moral Governance by Ideology

Much energy and ingenuity went into moral propaganda, which, while drawing on
employees’ participation, sought, as in the West (Boyce 1996) to manipulate meaning rather
than to nurture co-enquiry. In all companies except the private HVC and RHK, the task of
transmitting ideology, the content of which has already been presented and summarized in
Table 3, was the domain of the Party. At WISCO, for example, the Party-run department of
corporate culture re-engineering disseminated propaganda via a TV station and a daily
newspaper, and provided ideological ethics training for all staff. Even at born private RHK,
where a ‘Confucius Business Institute’ provided ideological training, this apparently was done
under Party supervision. In this section, we describe the main propaganda vehicles and assess
their overall impact on employee conduct.
Model Workers

Model Workers (MWs) are a Maoist legacy (Hua 1995: 43) and remain propaganda
vehicles (Palmer 1997; China Daily 2000b). Legendary MWs include soldier Lei Feng (Ebrey
1993; Yang 1998), a selfless ‘cog in a wheel’ (Chan 1985: 66), who ‘was perfectly altruistic,
without the slightest self interested calculations or self-doubts, righteousness incarnate’ (Chan
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1985: 61), and Canadian physician Dr. Norman Bethune (Pai-ch’iu-en) (Mao 1990).
Emphasis on pure altruism distinguished these icons from Stalin’s Russian Stakhanovites,
who received material benefits (Sil 1997: 126). Most case companies participated in MW
competitions — WISCO, for example, boasted 51 national MWs, 60 municipal level MWs,
and 8000 company level MWs. Prizes tended to remain ‘spiritual’, little more than souvenir
photographs (except at RHK). Historically, because of this, and the association with political
conformity, such competitions have failed to motivate workers (Chan 1997: 97). We found
that by focusing on technical achievement, and on sales and productivity results,
contemporary selection criteria reflected the new emphases on modernism and pragmatic
market enterprise. Indeed, one case company, the private RHK, departed from Maoist
tradition entirely, adopting a Western ‘sales conference’ approach, under which the top ten
winners received 30,000 Yuan each, nearly as much as SOE workers earned in their whole
career.

Hero Stories

Some MWs received special praise. Two leaders of our case companies had received
MW awards: Mao Dong-sheng, chairman of WDS, was portrayed as a visionary SOE
reformer, while RHK’s president, Xie Sheng-ming, was hailed an entrepreneur committed to
meeting people’s needs. Hero stories also featured grassroots MWs, such as Liu Li at WDS,
who learned several languages in order to handle foreign customers, and who understood the
needs of blind and deaf people. Wang Tao, a car mechanic from DCA’s parent Dongfeng
factory in Northern Hubei, combined altruism, perseverance and technical excellence with a
zest for self improvement (China Daily 1998) and came top of the 1998 national list of MWs.
Later that year, in honour of Wang Tao and Lei Feng, the Party branch at DCA’s Wuhan
factory organized a MW competition titled ‘Learning from Wang Tao to raise our standards’.
The winners, a model team (Youth Civilization Line) of paint shop workers, had heroically
shaved their heads after one found a strand of hair on the paintwork. They and six individual
MWs feature in a hagiographic booklet (Dongfeng-Citroen Automobile Company 1998). One
chapter tells of hard-working, helpful and ingenious electrician Lee Hong Kit, ‘the very Wang
Tao of ours’, who helped set up the Wuhan factory. When outside foreign equipment
suppliers invited him to dinner, ‘Lee politely declined all such invitations, because he knew
that accepting entertainment might give rise to conflict of interest and ethical dilemmas’.
Another chapter tells of Lee Wang Pang, who gives all his wages to his widowed mother. For
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him, ‘Wang Tao is like a big brother in my heart, he has given me so much inspiration’.
During our visit to DCA, the Party’s propaganda effort centred on the paint shop workers.
Interviewees reported that both the French and the Chinese general managers had been moved
by the team’s actions. A paint shop worker told us: ‘We didn’t think it was such a big thing,
but when the (Chinese) general manager discovered what was going on, he decided that we
were a good model worth using as propaganda’.

Slogans or Mottoes

At RHK, a senior working group, in consultation with employees, had compiled a set
of twelve proverbs that was referred to as ‘cultural rational knowledge’. Other companies held
slogan competitions, for example, at WISCO’s cold rolled steel mill, competitions for a
factory image and an employee motto had drawn 140 and 300 entries, respectively. At WDS,
an employee was rewarded for suggesting the following for posting up in staff areas: ‘A scrap
of paper on the ground, a piece of lost civilization found’, ‘Are you smiling to the customers
today?’ ‘Make sure everything is done perfectly, even the minor details’. Slogans
accumulated (as many as 40 at WISCO’s no. 3 steel plant), and there could be confusion
about which ones were still in force, for example, at DCA both the Party secretary and human
resource office said the company had only one slogan, but the Chinese general manager
quoted four.

Negative Cases

WISCO’s management used the occasion of annual factory meetings to present cases
of corruption, such as that of a purchasing officer jailed for 14 years for taking bribes totalling
610,000 Yuan. RHK’s director of discipline took one hour at each annual sales meeting to
discuss negative cases, such as that of a Hainan-based salesman who took a 40,000-Yuan
kickback, and the company magazine reported these. At WDS, the story of a corrupt deputy
general manager was similarly publicized.

Organized Dialogue and Self-learning

There was only one mention of open dialogue. This was at WISCO, where the various
plants arranged annual meetings to discuss SSCC, the most recent of which had considered
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the demands of the market economy. The general manager/Party secretary at WISCO’s cold
rolled silicon steel mill, said, ‘For the workers, it is self-learning. It is important that the
management does not set out to teach, but rather seeks to make them learn from discussion’.

Questioning the Effectiveness of Moral Propaganda

Party propaganda, as with Western corporate ideology (Collins 1999; Payne and
Wayland 1999) may not have won hearts and minds. Managers implied, subtly, that it had
little or no impact on employees’ moral conduct. For example, at CE we were told, ‘It is
actual events that provide the most effective education. The workers now realize the reality of
labour layoffs that arise from enterprise inefficiencies and they treasure their jobs’. A middle
manager at WDS pointed out, ‘Actually it is the competitive environment itself that makes the
enterprise and its staff raise their ethical standards’. There were hints also of the erosion of the
Party’s credibility as a provider of moral leadership. As one Party secretary admitted,
‘Generally speaking, the reputation of the labour Union and of the Party is not too bad,
however ideological work is not a panacea’.

Moral Self Efficacy of the Workforce

This element in our OMA model relates to the problem of dependency ethos, noted
earlier, and was highlighted by comments by managers and Party officials in some of the case
companies, about a poorly developed work ethic, manifest in indiscipline, lack of application,
and reluctance to take responsibility. Interviewees attributed the problem to the legacies of the
‘iron rice bowl’ and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). This complaint applied especially
to the large SOEs, WISCO and CE, described as deeply rooted in the planned economy, and
still operating as near-total communities, on which the entire workforce and their families
depended for free ‘cradle to grave’ services. Managers implied that they saw the SOEs’ duty
to provide care and sheltering as a bleak and thankless one; a WISCO middle manager said,
for example: ‘If we can feed all these people, we benefit society, because making so many
people unemployed will cause social panic and disorder’. In the smaller SOE, WDS,
managers also reported a syndrome of dependency. Despite hyperbole, reported earlier, about
the breaking of the ‘two big bowls of rice’, most WDS employees still received extensive
company-based welfare services, and could rely on continued employment so long as they did
not break company rules. Data was not available for HVC.
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Among the non-SOEs, EB had inherited its workforce, and possibly with it the ‘iron
rice bowl’ legacy, from the Chinese parent company, but descriptions of the workforces at
DCA and RHK contrasted sharply with those of the SOEs, in that they had grown up during
new times. At DCA, 85% of employees were under 28, many of them, including front line
workers in production and marketing, recruited from Universities or colleges. Managers spoke
of DCA’s elite company culture: ‘We really feel that Dongfeng Co. and this one are different’,
said one. Managers at RHK also claimed that their company had an elite culture. One
explained that although staff of ‘variable’ quality had been recruited during a period of rapid
expansion, after the mass layoffs that followed a slump in demand, the best-educated staff
with the ‘best ethical records’ remained. RHK’s company brochure reported that 88% of staff
had a college background and that the average age was 28.

Formal Moral Governance Through Systems of Regulation

Organizational systems of regulation cover a wide gamut, including purchasing and
sales, resource allocation, compensation, and workplace discipline. A common analytical
issue underpinning these otherwise miscellaneous arrangements concerns how justly they are
conceived and administered. We now assess the procedural consistency (strictness versus
laxity) and arbitrariness (imposed ‘rule by law’ versus consensually just ‘rule of law’) of the
regulatory systems adopted in the case study companies. We also note the origins of the more
consensually just systems. Since there were considerable variations in FMG practices between
the companies, we present our findings according to clusters of companies.

FMG Through Regulation at the Two Large SOEs

Accounts suggested that there was a blend of imposed rule by law and procedural
laxity at both WISCO and CE. Managers at both companies appeared impatient with
egalitarian reward systems, experiencing them as rule by law impositions. There were also
reports of arbitrary punishments for workers who made mistakes or performed poorly. At
WISCO’s Cold-Rolled Silicon Steel Mill, workers were punished for delivering steel of the
wrong thickness by having to re-do the job at xiagang rate wages, which in one case took six
months. At CE, if workers arrived three minutes late, they lost bonus and salary. Interviewees
at both companies reported that a blind eye was being turned to corruption and that it was
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being covered up. Criticisms of procedural laxity were especially severe at WISCO where, for
example, one manager complained:

‘There are numerous rules and procedures, but leaders don’t use them to check
subordinates’ performance. Since they are irrelevant to employees’ income and
promotion, no one will obey them’.

FMG Through Regulation at the Two JVCs and WDS

It appeared, at these companies, that compared with others, systems of regulation were
seen as less arbitrary, more just. Reward systems at DCA were, for example, accepted by
managers as equitable, because those at the top received twice the average salary of ordinary
DCA employees, which itself was high in relation to the Wuhan average. Non pay-related
systems of rules and procedures at DCA and EB that had been introduced by the respective
French partners were also praised as fair and rational and strict (i.e. consistently applied). For
example, one DCA middle manager said:

‘There are 3 situations in our company, which require total obedience. The first is the
application of the law of country and the rules of the enterprise. Second are the new
problems that are discussed and it is ensured that everyone in the company
understands what to do. Third, in an emergency situation, management gives direct
orders and staff obey.’

Middle managers at EB also reported that rules were strictly enforced and procedures
strictly applied, and that rewards and punishments were equitable. This may have left some
room for draconian improvisation: EB’s previous general manager had applied ‘feeling,
reason and law’, arbitrarily doubling the fine if he judged a breach to be serious, in one case a
quality inspector incurred a 1000-Yuan fine for a ‘large mistake’.

WDS, as noted earlier, modelled its systems of regulation on the Hong Kong based
parent company of a subsidiary JVC. This required the formal documentation and approval by
the general manager of all financial decisions and rested on the principles: ‘all income
belongs to the company’, and ‘the system is bigger than the general manager’. Regarding
employee work discipline, a WDS middle manager explained:
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‘We prioritise law, reason and sympathy in that order, not the reverse. For example,
general manager Hu, when patrolling on the 3rd Floor before opening time, found a
male staff member in his mid 30s sitting on the floor. This is not allowed under the
rules. She asked the man what was going on, and the man replied that he had no
money, had not eaten breakfast, and felt weak. Hu instructed the man’s manager to
punish him by recording a serious mistake and fining him 50 Yuan, according to the
rules. After further inquiries, Hu discovered that the man’s wife had recently given
birth to twins, and that she had been laid off. Life was sad and difficult for them. The
company still applied the punishment. However, the company Union visited his family,
gave gifts to his two children and the company arranged for him to receive an extra
100-Yuan monthly allowance, and assigned him to a better post. Subsequently the
staff member’s behaviour improved, and he told others that the company’s system of
law, reason and sympathy made him improve upon his very poor prior conduct.

Thus the WDS management was said to be consistently strict in the application of
disciplinary rules, but could exercise clemency, although employees had no right to expect
this. For example, three high-performing staff who were caught smoking in the washroom
were dismissed on the spot. One middle manager recounted the story, also reported in a
popular book by general manager Hu (1999: 168), of a sales supervisor who quarrelled with a
customer over a return and refund request for an 18,000-Yuan diamond ring that had been an
unwanted present. The supervisor received a fine and was also made to suffer the humiliation
of going the customer’s home to apologize and return the money. Middle managers at WDS
reported, accordingly, that employees were frightened of punishment. WDS sought to
administer an equitable performance-based reward system, under which basic pay was as low
as 350 Yuan per month for ordinary shop workers, and a variable element, based on objective
measures of sales performance and on line supervisors’ appraisal judgements, could exceed
that amount. Some middle managers reported, however, that shop workers, obsessed with
money, engaged in gamesmanship and ‘window dressing’, thus distorting the system.

FMG Through Regulation at RHK and HVC

Born-private RHK had, like WDS, adopted a reward system heavily based on sales
performance, but unlike WDS there were no reports of problems with it, possibly because
RHK’s average take home pay (in Wuhan) was twice the Wuhan average, much higher than
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that of WDS. RHK had benchmarked many of its other regulatory systems indirectly on a
Hong Kong company, and appeared to aspire to procedural consistency, with less concern for
whether the systems were arbitrary or consensually just. A middle manager claimed, ‘Our
regulation system covers almost every corner of management. Our president has emphasized
that we’d rather not do anything if the necessary regulation is not established’. For example,
there were fines (termination for the third offence) for lateness, poor hygiene and failing to
wear an identity badge. The Party secretary/regional chief executive claimed that the company
practised military management, at least in the Wuhan area: ‘Subordinates aren’t allowed to
argue with or question their supervisor’s command.’ Another middle manager spoke of
assemblies at RHK headquarters:

‘Every Monday morning, the president holds a meeting in the yard of the HQ.
Sometimes he will ask a staff member, at random, to report his work arrangement for
the week. If he cannot present this clearly, he will be criticized. Once a young man’s
answer was so bad that the president declared a punishment on the spot: 3 month’s
bonus was removed.’

RHK also had a legal department, an audit department and financial and fiscal
committee at headquarters, reporting directly to the president. Despite all this regulatory
machinery, comments suggested that it operated in a lax manner, much as in the two large
SOEs. One middle manager estimated, for example, that each level in the hierarchy obeyed
only 80% of instructions received, so that only about 40% of what front-line staff did actually
conformed with official procedures and rules.

There appeared to be much less satisfaction with HVC’s reward system than with
RHK’s. HVC’s middle managers regarded the differential between their salaries and those of
ordinary workers to be unjust. While they reported that the managing director corrected for
this by rewarding managers for special projects, they complained that this was not done in a
just and transparent manner. Other aspects of regulation at HVC were seen as unsystematic
and arbitrary. There were complaints that the general manager made up all the rules, that these
were not always clear, fair and reasonable and that as a consequence, the company culture (in
our terms, the DIS and NBNS aspects of OMA) was characterized by blame avoidance,
‘politics’ and lack of initiative.
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Basis of Moral Authority

In this section, we focus, where data was available, on the BMA of the leading
figureheads of each case company. We and assess whether their authority was of a
disempowering nature (based on the politics of domination, manipulation or headship), or
whether it was trust-oriented (grounded in deferential or critical trust).

Problematic BMA at the Two Large SOEs

A legacy of disempowerment was reported at both large SOEs. At CE, according to
Ha Saikit, the current general manager, his predecessor ‘had supreme authority, his words
were the company’s policy and decision’, implying a BMA of domination, the
disempowerment of others. That person had also set himself above the law

having

transferred the ownership of a Philippines-based subsidiary worth $650,000 to a personal
friend, he had disappeared shortly before his compulsory retirement was due. This incident, a
manifestation of the so-called ’59 phenomenon’ (Jiang 2000), is also reported by Xin and
Chen (1999: 50-51). Mr. Ha was said by middle managers to adopt a more transparent,
rational and consultative approach to decision making than his predecessor had done. Mr. Ha,
nonetheless, saw nothing wrong in exercising leadership that might be considered ‘forceful’.
For example, he reported that in the case of one rushed deadline, he had pressurized senior
managers by withholding their salaries, paying them only the xiagang rate until the job had
been completed. They finished in time, and got their money back with 10% interest.

WISCO’s problematic BMA legacy was the converse of that at CE: a system of
headship served to neutralize the leadership, disempowering the top. Guanxi networks
protected managers at various levels in the organizational hierarchy from scrutiny and
accountability. A middle manager reported:

‘Our company’s inner circle relationship network is very complicated and has lasted
more than 40 years. When a newcomer joins the company, he has to follow existing
informal rules. The Premier Vice-President, appointed two years ago, paid much
attention to internal corruption. Once he was informed that a sales manager received a
bribe in a deal with a customer from Guangdong province. He asked his subordinates
to investigate the case thoroughly. But soon, the subordinates found that the case
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involved many employees, including some senior managers. The investigation was
obstructed and eventually stalled. He discovered that his power was limited compared
with that of an established system. He was frustrated deeply. Half a year ago, he
resigned from his post.’

Deferential Trust at the Two JVCs and at WDS

At the two JVCs, EB and DCA, deferential trust centred on the integrity of the
regulatory systems imported by the foreign partners, and appeared to spill over into trust in
the integrity of the leaders themselves. For example, a middle manager at EB said, about the
general manager, who was a Hong Kong Chinese, Canadian passport holder, ‘He is Canadian,
he abides by the laws strictly!’ At DCA, the Chinese general manager declared that
employees should be loyal to the company, rather than to himself. Middle managers at DCA
expressed confidence that regulatory systems were followed at all levels; annual external
auditing by Hong Kong based accountants and a regulatory code of conduct for cadres may
have reinforced their confidence. At WDS, where regulatory systems were modelled on a
subsidiary JVC, as noted earlier, middle managers were also confident that everyone was
subject to the rules. For the chairman, Mao Dong-sheng, saw management’s accountability to
the shareholders as a foundation for trust.

‘We always say the regulations have more power than the general manager. So I as a
general manager, must obey the regulations first and foremost. If I didn't obey the
regulations, no one would obey them. So we must have something to supervise the
general manager.’

Contrasting BMA at RHK and HVC

At RHK, there appeared to be strong deference to the moral authority of Founderpresident Xie Sheng-ming, He was seen as the charismatic force behind the company’s
success, and had achieved the rare honour for a private businessman of being appointed as a
non Party member to the National People’s Congress. Unlike WISCO, the laxity of RHK’s
regulatory systems was not attributed to failure of leadership authority, nor to a corrupt
counter-culture, but rather to the unique control problems entailed by the geographical
dispersion of operations across rural areas throughout China. The BMA at HVC appeared, by
31

contrast, to be domination based. HVC’s general manager, a former Wuhan government
official, had a substantial personal shareholding, and according to middle managers, he
hoarded all decision making authority, required unquestioning obedience, and treated them as
mere ‘wage earners’. A middle manager reported:

‘Since its foundation, the company has had three general managers and has recruited
three distinct batches of employees. The general managers have had different business
beliefs and approaches, so employees’ values differ correspondingly. Frankly speaking,
in this situation, people just learn to obey’.

Assessments of Moral Conduct

MEQs were completed by 47 of the middle management interviewees. The MEQs
included five nine-point Likert scales on perceived moral conduct (1 = totally disagree, 9 =
totally agree). The items in question were:
§

(On honesty). If I act honestly in every aspect of my present job, I will be praised

§

(On care). My overall impression is that my colleagues will take greatest care to avoid any
damage to the community or to the environment

§

(On truthfulness). I believe that my staff always keep reliable and accurate records when
they have business meetings

§

(On responsibility). Staff take responsibility to do everything properly, even when such
work is not specified in their duties

§

(On fairness) I am confident that my company treats every customer and supplier in a fair
manner.

Figure 2 summarizes the ratings by middle managers, placing born-private RHK, and the two
JVCs (DCA and EB), above the four SOEs in terms of integrity. Mann-Whitney U tests
(Siegel 1956) indicated that the differences between DCA and HVC [U (8,6) = 3, P < 0.01)],
DCA and WISCO [U (8,8) = 2, P < 0.001], and DCA and WDS [U (8,8) = 14, P < 0.05] were
statistically significant. Differences between RHK and HVC [U (6,6) = 4, P < 0.01]], and
RHK and WISCO [U (8,6) = 6, P = 0.01] were also significant.

32

Figure 2
Ratings of Moral Conduct
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Table 4
Aspects of Moral Atmosphere at the Focal Companies
Company
DCA
RHK

EB
CE
WDS
WISCO
HVC

Workforce
quality
Educated
elite
Educated
elite
Legacy of
dependency
Dependency
ethos
Legacy of
dependency
Dependency
ethos
?

Non-ideological FMG
(excluding reward system)
Consensual rule of law
Procedural rigour
Some consensual rule of law
Some imposed rule by law
Procedural laxity
Mostly consensual rule of law
Procedural rigour
Imposed rule by law
Procedural laxity
Consensual rule of law
Procedural rigour
Imposed rule by law
Procedural laxity
Imposed rule by law
Procedural laxity
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Perceived equity of
the reward system
Equitable
Equitable

Equitable

BMA of the leadership
Trusted to conform to a
robust regulatory system
Trusted through
charismatic authority

Inequitable

Trusted to conform to a
robust regulatory system
Forceful

Equitable on paper
Possible distortions
Inequitable

Trusted to conform to a
robust regulatory system
Disempowered

Inequitable

Domination

CONCLUSIONS

How Problematic is the Wider Context?

The wider context of network Capitalism appears to make it very difficult to uphold
high standards of organizational integrity. Propagation of moral ideology through Party
channels may have been intended as a surrogate for a legal system, but that ideology appears
too loosely coupled, incoherent and incompatible with unofficial values, to govern social and
economic order. Organizational guanxi and other questionable business practices, some not
mentioned here, were regarded as survival imperatives, even by employees at RHK, rated
second out of seven companies in terms of overall integrity.

Normative incoherence prevents the Party from convincingly differentiating legitimate
from illegitimate means of wealth accumulation. A related problem in SOEs is that of
distributive injustice, for managers reject the Maoist legacy of equality-based salaries and
benefits, but are unable, owing to lack of funds, to implement market-based or formal equitybased remuneration. SOE employees use idiosyncratic and illegitimate tactics, such as
moonlighting, ‘window-dressing’, commission taking, and

at the very top

the ‘59

phenomenon’, to restore equity through the back door.

A further problem, especially at the large SOEs, is that of employee dependency and
an associated lack of work discipline. DCA avoided the problem by negotiating an elite
recruitment policy, and RHK could hire and fire at will, but these options were not open to
CE and WISCO, and if translated into mass layoffs merely create other social problems. The
large SOEs lacked resources to reward punctuality, diligence, accuracy, etc., and could not
dismiss those who fell short of standards. Managers there appeared to regard fines as the only
disciplinary tool open to them. Punishment does not, however, instruct the culprit on how to
improve, it ‘requires constant vigilance on the part of a supervisor’, and it “encourages efforts
to ‘beat the system’” (Blanchard and Thacker 1999: 91). With no incentives for supervisors to
police their lifelong neighbours, it is no surprise that punishment-based regulation at WISCO
and CE was lax and ineffective.
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What Might be Done to Achieve and Maintain Organizational Integrity?

Managers looked beyond the Party for moral leadership. At WDS, and at the two
JVCs, DCA and EB, they had a high regard for rational-legal systems of administration,
brought in by overseas partners. These differed, on paper at least, from the punishmentoriented disciplinary regimes practised (and evaded) at CE, WISCO, RHK and HVC, in that
they entailed a more complete system of internal rule of law. Thus they aspired to the
transparent, open, and rigorous enforcement of a set of rules and procedures seen to be fair
and reasonable, independently of the idiosyncratic will of individual administrators, and its
application to everyone, with no exemptions, regardless of rank or connections. The
significant difference in conduct ratings between DCA and WDS suggests that such systems
may require hands-on collaboration by a non-mainland partner (as at DCA) in order to operate
as intended, and not be skewed toward a self-fulfilling version of ‘theory X’. That they are not
a panacea may also be appreciated by extrapolating from the case of RHK, where
geographical dispersion was a barrier to the operation of any system.

The only mention of developmental approaches to building OMA was at WISCO,
where there had been some attempt to foster open dialogue among employees. It could be that
open dialogue with no ‘right answer’ contrasts with the traditional modus operandi of the
Party, and that the potential benefits of dialogue are overshadowed if one-way propaganda
predominates. Developmental approaches, essentially alien and untried, entailing freedom of
thought and voice, may yet provide a means of resolving otherwise intractable OMA
problems on the Chinese mainland.

.
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